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Abstract 
In an attempt at a systematic theory of entrepreneurship, this paper connects various literatures, from 
economics and business. In economics, there are many notions of entrepreneurship, some of which seem 
to contradict each other. For example, there are notions of entrepreneurship as an equilibrating and as a 
disequilibrating force. In this paper, these differences are connected with the issue of exploitation and 
exploration from the business literature. The question is how one can explore while maintaining 
exploitation. For this, a cycle of discovery has been proposed, with stages of equilibration and 
disequilibration which build on each other, in process where exploitation leads to exploration. It is 
proposed that different notions of entrepreneurship can be associated with different stages of that cycle. 
In this way, different types of entrepreneurship complement each other in an ongoing process of 
discovery. 
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1 A large part of the text of this paper is taken from Bart Nooteboom: Learning and innovation in 
organizations and economies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 (paperback in 2001).  
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Introduction 
In the history of economics one finds a variety of notions of entrepreneurship, emphasizing different 
activities (cf. Hébert & Link 1982, Chell et.al. 1991, Thurik 1996, van Praag 1996, Blaug 1997), as 
follows: 
 
-  acceptance of (‘real’) uncertainty (Knight) 
-  innovation (Bentham, Thünen , Schumpeter and perhaps Say) 
-  creative destruction by novel combinations (Schumpeter) 
-  arbitrage: the identification and utilization of possibilities for matching supply and demand 
(Cantillon, Smith, Menger, Mizes, Hayek, Kirzner) 
-  the provision of capital (Marshall) 
-  creating or entering new markets (Mangoldt, Schumpeter) 
-  the configuration and management of production factors for efficient production (Say, Marshall, 
Mizes) 
-  finding a proper balance between market and organization (Coase) and a proper governance 
structure for forms of organization ‘between market and hierarchy’ (Williamson) 
  
According to Schumpeter entrepreneurs form an elite, while according to (other) Austrian theorists 
(especially von Mizes) entrepreneurship is widely dispersed. Associated with different roles of entrepre-
neurs different characteristics, resources or competencies have been identified: 
 
- alertness, perceptiveness, open - mindedness, imagination, idiosyncratic perception and initiative, 
independence, internal ‘locus of control’ 
- judgement, sense of realism, decisiveness 
- risk acceptance, risk reduction 
- perseverance, ambition or need for achievement 
- charisma, strength of personality; capability of leadership, managerial capability, 
 
How do we reconcile these widely diverging notions of entrepreneurship? Do the different types of 
activity have to be combined at the same time, or are they required at different times, in some 
development process, by different people perhaps? Can the different characteristics be combined in one 
person, or do they have to be distributed across different people who complement each other?  
It has been argued that the provision of capital is not part of entrepreneurship, since capital can be 
obtained from capital markets, and that management is not part of it, since that can be hired (Blaug 1996). 
However, in view of the ‘real’, Knightian uncertainty involved in entrepreneurship, and the idiosyncracy 
of perception and initiative that characterize entrepreneurship, outside supply of capital can be 
problematic, so that the entrepreneur has to supply his own at least in part (Casson 1982). Management is 
not routine in the early stages of exploring Schumpeterian novel combinations, so that the entrepreneur 
has to supply his own leadership and management. I will also argue that the development and adaptation 
of organization after initial stages of innovation constitute a non-trivial task, requiring ingenuity and the 
ability to effect organizational change. So, it seems that the provision of capital and management are still 
part of entrepreneurship.  
I propose that rather than any single notion or characteristic of entrepreneurship, or any specific 
configuration of some of them being ‘the correct one’, regardless of context and conditions, different 
notions fit different stages in an overall process of discovery. The analysis draws from the work of 
Nooteboom (1999a, 2000). For readers familiar with Austrian economics: entrepreneurship is framed 
here in terms of a Hayekian discovery process. One may think that such a theory of discovery is logically 
impossible, since it would entail the prediction of discovery, and if discovery could be predicted it would 
no longer constitute discovery. But this is mistaken: we may well be able to specify a heuristic of 
discovery without thereby being able to predict its outcomes. 
A central issue is whether entrepreneurs achieve equilibrium, by arbitrage (Cantillon, Kirzner) or destroy 
it (Schumpeter). I will argue that equilibration and disequilibration build on each other, are stages in a 
process of development. Hence, discovery requires both, succeeding each other in ongoing cycles of 
discovery. 
  2This is related to the issue of exploration and exploitation in the organisation literature (Holland 1957, 
March 1991). In order to survive in the short term, firms must efficiently exploit current resources. In 
order to survive in the long term they have to develop new resources. Thus, to survive now and later, they 
need to combine exploitation and exploration. That is a paradoxical task. 
The heuristic of discovery used here links exploitation and exploration, with shifts of emphasis from the 
one to the other. The heuristic consists of several stages succeeding each other in an ongoing cycle. Here, 
a brief summary is given, and in later sections the stages will be discussed in more detail. First, to start 
somewhere on the circle, there is a process of reducing variety of content (equilibration, here called 
‘consolidation’), which yields a ‘dominant design’ as the basis for efficient exploitation, as recognised in 
the innovation literature. This yields a platform for transferring the practice or product to novel contexts 
(diffusion, here called ‘generalization’), and that yields a basis for exploration, while maintaining 
exploitation. In novel contexts one encounters limits of viability and usefulness, which require adaptation 
(called ‘differentiation’). Contacts with similar practices in the novel context suggest opportunities for 
importing new elements, in a process of hybridization (here called ‘reciprocation’). This puts existing 
architectures of products and organizations under strain for several reasons, but especially because the 
constraints that they impose prevent novel elements from realizing their full potential. This yields 
pressures to break them down (creative destruction) and to develop novel configurations of elements 
from different practices and contexts. Experience accrued from the earlier stages of generalization, 
differentiation and reciprocation feeds imagination, gives indications for what elements and architectural 
principles to try out. Thus experimentation with novel combinations is not blind or completely random, 
but there still is radical uncertainty, and much trial and error. And here we are back at the beginning, with 
an ambiguous novelty that requires consolidation. Summing up: discovery emerges from an alternation of 
variety of content and variety of context. Variety of content is reduced (equilibration), is then subjected to 
an opening of variety of context, which yields the basis for creating new variety of content 
(disequilibration). 
The theory of discovery is based on a theory of knowledge, which has implications for the theory of the 
firm. These will be briefly summarized. But first I further discuss the issue of equilibration and 
disequilibration.  
 
Equilibration and disequilibration 
The entrepreneur according to Schumpeter has variously been characterized as being non - adaptive, 
causing disequilibrium, generating innovation in the form of ‘novel combinations’, giving rise to creative 
destruction, and increasing uncertainty (Cheah & Robertson 1992). The entrepreneur according to (other) 
Austrians (Menger, Hayek and more recently Kirzner) is adaptive; reacting to exogenous shocks of 
change, and draws the economy towards equilibrium, even if such equilibrium will never be achieved, 
due to changes of conditions along the way. There is an important difference, also in the more modern 
Austrian theory of Kirzner. Consider the following quote (Kirzner 1973: 127, quoted in Foster 1998: 14): 
‘For Schumpeter the entrepreneur is the disruptive, disequilibrating force that dislodges the market from 
the somnolence of equilibrium; for us the entrepreneur is the equilibrating force whose activity responds 
to the existing tensions and provides those corrections for which the unexploited opportunities have been 
crying out’. In this arbitrage view of entrepreneurship Kirzner is close to Cantillon.  
While Kirzner's entrepreneur is more ‘alert’ to new possibilities than other people, this is ‘... not really a 
theory about how agents create new data, but how they react to new data’ (Foss 1994: 111). The question 
is how entrepreneurial action can also yield ‘new data’: how entrepreneurs can break through existing 
categorical imperatives. 
Note that even Schumpeter was unable to endogenize creation in the form of invention (cf. Witt 1993): 
innovation was the realization of potential offered by invention. In the present theory of discovery the 
ambition is to endogenize not only the realization but also the creation of potential, and thereby bring 
diverse notions of entrepreneurship together in a unifying theory.  
Schumpeter made a well - known distinction between two different sources of innovation. The first, often 
called Schumpeter's ‘mark I’ notion of entrepreneurship, is the independent small entrepreneur, who acts 
by intuition, in bounded rationality, and survives or succumbs in trial and error. The second or ‘mark II’ 
source of innovation is the large, rationalized Weberian firm, with innovation by planning on the basis of 
specialized teams. Usually, these ‘first’ and ‘second’ notions of entrepreneurship are interpreted as 
Schumpeter changing his mind. On the basis of quotes from Schumpeter's older and later work Langlois 
  3(1998) shows that the mark II notion was already present in his earlier work. The two notions are 
sequential not in the sense that Schumpeter changed his mind but in the sense that in the development of 
capitalism both the early (1909, English translation 1934) and late (1942) Schumpeter expected mark I to 
be replaced by mark II, in an ongoing Weberian process of rationalization. But this yields a puzzle: can 
one have radically novel combinations, and the associated creative destruction of technology, while 
preserving the organizational integrity of a large firm? I will argue that this is problematic, and that while 
there are good reasons for Chandlerian integration of activities in a large firm, disintegration is needed for 
ongoing innovation. It will be argued that mark I and mark II follow each other, in an ongoing cycle of 
discovery. There is no end to history.   
In his later work Kirzner (1985) recognized the linkage and complementarity between Schumpeterian 
innovation and Austrian arbitrage. Cheah & Robertson (1992) made a further attempt to demonstrate the 
complementarity and interdependence of Schumpeterian and Austrian entrepreneurship, by proposing 
that along the product life cycle shifts occur between the two types of entrepreneurship. Here, their 
argument will be extended and partly modified. 
 
Discovery and utilization 
There are cases of entrepreneurship that are difficult to assign to either the Schumpeterian or the 
Kirznerian type, because they contain elements of both. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs build on inventions 
that were already there and in that sense also ‘merely’ utilize existing potential. And there are different 
levels of innovativeness: radical and incremental, innovations of principle and innovations of application, 
in different fields or contexts. 
An important type of innovation, between Schumpeterian entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship 
according to (other) Austrians, is product differentiation. It can be reconstructed as bridging gaps be-
tween supply and demand in Lancasterian product characteristics space (Lancaster 1966), by offering 
novel combinations of available product characteristics. This is Austrian in that no new characteristic 
appears, and gaps are bridged in characteristics space by varying the intensities of characteristics in their 
mix. Differentiation becomes more Schumpeterian when it consists of the addition of a new product 
dimension, which subjects the positions of existing products and preferences to a jolt (Péli & Nooteboom 
1999). 
Another example of an innovation that contains elements of both Schumpeterian and Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship is the example of railroads discussed by Schumpeter (1939). Uncertainty is reduced as 
railroads diffuse, and entrepreneurship in this area becomes increasingly routine. But now consider the 
‘ice station’ innovation of beer brewer Annheuser Bush (AB). By combining railroad transportation with 
the cooling of beer by means of ‘ice stations’, AB greatly extended the feasible distance between market 
and production, thereby realizing great economies of scale in brewing. An innovation that seems 
Schumpeterian was produced as a combination of well diffused, settled technologies of railroads and 
cooling, in an identification of possibilities from existing technology and practice which might as well be 
seen as Kirznerian. 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs build on inventions that were already there, and in that sense also ‘merely’ 
utilize existing potential. And there are different levels of innovativeness: basic innovations, which have 
pervasive effects for many production sectors and markets, and cumulative innovations in the form of 
diverse applications and modifications of such basic technology in different fields or contexts. Without 
such innovations of application, creative destruction would not take place, and the basic innovation 
would remain a mere potentiality. Is this secondary innovation Schumpeterian or Kirznerian? It is 
Schumpeterian in that it creates forms that did not exist before, upsets the allocation of resources 
established before, and exerts creative destruction. It is Kirznerian in that in the process of diffusion, 
along the ‘technical trajectory’ (cf. Dosi, 1984), uncertainty is reduced, and gaps between actual and 
possible use are reduced. Thus, along the trajectory we find a combination of the two types, with the 
emphasis shifting from Schumpeterian to Kirznerian, as pointed out by Cheah & Robertson (1992). 
Conceptually the distinction may be maintained, but mixes or intermediate cases appear. 
Note that diffusion does not consist in a simple mechanical ‘working out’ of a single innovation. 
Generally, new contexts or new applications require adjustment or ‘re - invention’. Often, novel 
combinations are achieved in a mix of complementary innovations in technology, marketing, 
organization and institutional conditions. Different firms have different, partly firm - specific constel-
lations of resources, partly embedded in teams, organizational structure and culture, where adoption of 
  4innovation is seldom a mere slotting in and typically requires a reconstruction of existing structure, 
procedure and culture. What is established on an industry level may require quite fundamental shifts on 
the firm level. That is why in the innovation literature a distinction is made between processes new for 
the world, for an industry and for a firm. In short: diffusion requires innovation on the part of users. 
In this paper, entrepreneurship is seen in both the creation and the realization of potential. A Schumpete-
rian entrepreneur creates potential in the form of a new product or process, which is subsequently 
diffused, but realizes potential in that existing knowledge (invention) is transformed into commercially 
viable products and processes. An inventor creates potential for Schumpeterian entrepreneurs, but 
realizes potential from pre - existing knowledge. So, we retain the conceptual difference between 
Schumpeterian and Kirznerian entrepreneurship, as the production and realization of potential, but in a 
framework which allows for intermediate cases and recognizes that entrepreneurship will have more or 
less of the one or the other. We no longer have a Schumpeterian Shiva of creative destruction, far above 
the uniform grey masses of routine conduct, but a spectrum of innovation and diffusion, of creation and 
realization of potential. 
The point now is that in order to satisfy the Schumpeterian challenge, not only innovation but also the 
formation of perception, knowledge, meaning and preference must be endogenized (cf. Rosenberg 1992). 
Furthermore, as will be shown, the creation and realization of potential are mutually dependent, not only 
because realization requires prior creation, but also because realization provides the basis for a next round 
of creation. We need a theory that gives an account of the process of realization and creation of potential, 
which shows how creation arises from realization endogenously. How can we conceptualize an ongoing 
and open - ended process (Vaughn 1994: 169)? What conceptual framework can we devise to reconcile 
permanence, coherence and flexibility (Vaughn 1994: 157)?  
If innovation is creative destruction, what are the sources and process of creation? Does it strike at 
random? Is it like mutation in biological evolution? Does economic structure evolve from chance hits of 
entrepreneurial success, and evolutionary pressures eliminating maladapted firms? We need a theory of 
discovery. For that we need an underlying theory of knowledge. That, in turn, has implications for the 
theory of the firm.  
 
Theory of knowledge and learning 
Economics has no explicit theory of knowledge and learning. The implicit, espoused view is that of 
naive realism: we can observe reality, this yields information, which may cost time and money to 
collect, but when available yields the same, objective knowledge to different people. Language and 
communication are seen according to the label and conduit metaphors. A term is a label attached to an 
entity that is its meaning, and in communication these labelled packages are shipped across 
communication channels. 
Here, a different theory is employed, which is espoused in the organizational literature (Weick 1979, 
1995, Smircich 1983, Nooteboom 1992, Weick and Roberts 1993, Choo 1998). People observe, 
interpret and evaluate the world according to categories of perception, interpretation and evaluation 
that in turn have been developed in interaction with the physical and social world. This implies 
possible path-dependence of cognition. It also precludes claims of objectivity, because knowledge is 
constructed. However, it is likely to be in some way connected to reality, or representative of it, since 
it is by interaction with the world that we develop our ways of seeing it. This yields what Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) called ‘embodied realism’. However, we can’t make independent claims of realism, 
since we cannot ‘climb down from our minds to see how knowledge is attached to the world’. 
Our ability to construct views and interpretations in interaction with the world is inherited from 
evolution. Since this is a shared heritage, there is bound to be some similarity between people in the 
way they do this, and perhaps also in its outcomes. This saves us from the arid extremes of post-
modern relativism. However, since this ‘knowledge’ is developed from one’s specific, idiosyncretic 
experience in specific contexts, it is also bound to vary between people, to the extent that they have 
developed in different environments and have not communicated with each other. 
 The resulting variety of cognition, and the ambiguity it entails, is not a problem but an opportunity. It 
yields a source of innovation; of Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’. Since we cannot climb down 
from our minds to inspect the realism of our views, the variety of views that people have, from 
different experiences, yields the only opportunity we have for correcting our errors of knowledge.       
  5As a result of this cognitive variety there is always greater or lesser ‘cognitive distance’ between 
people. Learning from interaction requires sufficient distance for novelty but also sufficient proximity 
for understanding (Nooteboom 1992, 1999b). If effectiveness of learning is the mathematical product 
of comprehensibility and novelty, comprehensibility decreases linearly and novelty increases linearly 
with such distance, then effectiveness increases and then decreases according to an inverted U, whose 
top indicates optimal cognitive distance. The location of optimal distance depends on the relative 
importance of comprehensibility and novelty. Note the difference between crossing cognitive distance 
and reducing it. Crossing cognitive distance entails communication between people who think 
differently. Reducing cognitive distance entails convergence of cognition. In intensive, long term 
interaction cognitive distance will reduce, especially if it is also exclusive, i.e. if partners do not have 
different interactions with others as well.   
 
Purpose and identity of the firm 
The simple theory of knowledge indicated above gives the basis for a competence view of the purpose 
and boundaries of the firm. The basic purpose of the firm is to achieve a common purpose among 
people with complementary competencies. This requires a certain amount of alignment of cognitive 
categories for perception, interpretation and evaluation (which includes value judgements and 
intentionality). In other words: reduction of cognitive distance. This constitutes the notion of the firm 
as a ‘system of shared meanings’ (Smircich 1983), ‘focusing device’ (Nooteboom 1992), ‘collective 
mind’ (Weick and Roberts 1993) or ‘interpretation system’ (Choo 1998). The proper alignment of 
cognition, in this broad sense, including motivation and goals, is the primary task of leadership. It is 
related to the Schumpeterian notion of charisma as a crucial trait of entrepreneurs. Note that this 
alignment of perception and motivation reduces problems of opportunism: it reduces both the 
perception and the utilization of opportunities for opportunism. This widens the scope of human 
behaviour beyond the obsession with opportunism on the part of most economists. However, of course 
this does not imply that opportunism can be ignored. 
However, cognitive alignment in the firm’s focus entails a risk of myopia: relevant opportunities and 
threats are not perceived. To compensate for this, the firm needs complementary cognition from 
outside partners, to utilise ‘external economy of cognitive scope’ (Nooteboom 1992). This yields a 
new dimension for evaluating the purpose, choice and governance of inter-firm relations. Williamson 
(1999) claims that the competence view has not been able to give sharp predictions concerning the 
boundaries of the firm. But the present view gives such a prediction, and it runs counter to transaction 
cost economics. According to that theory, greater environmental uncertainty will (should) yield more 
integration under ‘hierarchy’, because it makes contracting and monitoring more difficult as an 
instrument to protect against the hazards of opportunism. According to the present perspective, greater 
uncertainty, in the sense of greater complexity and volatility of technology and markets, increases the 
need for outside complementary cognition, and hence will (should) lead to more, not fewer outside 
relations. This controversy is amenable to empirical test: Is there more or less integration when 
uncertainty in this sense is greater?  
Cognitive alignment in the firm, or in networks of firms, should not go so far as to reduce cognitive 
distance to zero, with everybody having the same, shared experiences and no outside contacts, or 
identical contacts. Homogeneity of cognition tends to have priority when efficient production is 
strategically crucial (exploitation), with division of labor and the utilization of economy of scale, 
requiring strong connections between component activities. Then the need for cognitive proximity 
prevails; optimal distance will be relatively small. Variety and novelty of cognition have priority when 
innovation (exploration) is strategically crucial. Then the need for cognitive distance prevails, and 
optimal distance will be relatively large. 
This brings us to the problem of exploitation and exploration. Exploitation often takes a narrow focus 
and integration, while exploration requires wider scope and disintegration. Thus boundaries of the firm 
depend on stages and conditions of learning and innovation. According to the logic set out above, 
boundaries of the firm will shift and there will be more or less integration, depending on whether the 
emphasis is on exploitation or on exploration. Alternatively, the firm (or a unit within a firm) engages 
in exploitation while conducting exploration with other organizations (units) at a larger cognitive 
distance. 
 
  6The problem of abduction  
The paradox of exploitation and exploration cannot be solved on the basis of rational choice among 
alternative options, because of (radical) uncertainty: we are dealing with a problem of abduction (Peirce 
1957). We need to find out what the options are. Options often materialize after taking action. The 
identification of options may follow rather than precede choice. How can we act on the basis of available 
knowledge and other competencies (exploitation) in a way that yields insights how to acquire new 
knowledge and competencies (exploration)? How can we gather elements and directions for 
Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’? 
Nooteboom (1999a, 2000) proposed a ‘heuristic of discovery’ to solve the problem of abduction. The 
heuristic consist of  a number of stages that are repeated along the cycle: consolidation, generalisation, 
differentiation, reciprocation and novel combinations. They are summarized below. 
 
Consolidation 
Novelty (in knowledge, technology and organization) does not spring forward ready-made and out of 
the blue. This happens only in the ancient Greek myth of the goddess of war and wile Pallas Athene 
springing fully armed from the brow of Zeus, the chief of gods. Novelty (novel concepts, practices, 
products, technologies) at the outset tends to be incompletely determinate. It emerges as a groping around 
with improvizations that need to crystallize and achieve consolidation in best practice, on the basis of 
experience with success and failure.
 
Schumpeter recognized this in his distinction between invention and its realization in a viable practice. 
This principle is also recognized in the notions of ‘industry recipes’ (Spender 1989) in industries, 
‘dominant designs’ (Abernathy & Utterback 1978) and ‘technological regimes’ (Teece 1988) in 
technologies, and ‘dominant logics’ (Bettis and Prahalad 1995) in organizations. In organizations they are 
embodied in rule based procedures, such as ‘performance programs’ or ‘routines’. Similarly, in cognitive 
science we encounter ‘paradigms’ (in the sense of exemplars to be emulated), ‘mental models’ (Johnson-
Laird 1983), ‘scripts’ (Abelson 1976, Shank and Abelson 1977), ‘prototypes’ (Rosch 1977) and 
‘stereotypes’ (Putnam 1975). These indicate that across all these fields of technology, organization, 
knowledge and language novelty becomes consolidated in a standard practice, which provides the 
basis for efficient exploitation.  
It is only after consolidation that geniuses can be distinguished from fools. When a person acquires a new 
practice, this tends to be ill defined and messy, with encumbrances from previous practice, and lapses 
back into more familiar practice. This is most pronounced in the case of learning from practice: a novel 
way of doing things seems to suggest itself, but it is not clear how or why precisely it should work. It 
happens even in areas that appear to be quite determinate and purely deductive, such as mathematics. The 
mathematician Gauss once exclaimed: ‘I have got my result; but I do not know yet how to get it’ (Popper 
1973: 16). This move to consolidation reflects a passage from tinkering to understanding, from intuition 
to knowledge, from tacit to codified knowledge, from technology to science. But also in formal learning, 
based on codified knowledge, the phenomenon of initial lack of clarity, confusion and stumbling arises, 
and practice is needed for the novel activity to be mastered smoothly.    
Repeated trials and application, supported by ancillary innovations in tools, methods, materials, are 
required to find out what properly belongs to the novel practice and what not. This yields increasing 
efficiency from a process of narrowing down, in a reduction of variety; by elimination of what step by 
step is found out to be redundant, inefficient or counter - productive. This entails learning to conduct an 
existing practice more efficiently, in exploitation. 
Note that the outcome need not be optimal and need not be unique. Several candidates may compete for 
dominance, or on the basis of ongoing improvements an old practice may compete, and alternatives may 
coexist for a long time. A well-known example of an old technology keeping up for a long time with a 
novel one is the prolonged existence of sailing ships next to steamships (Rosenberg 1972). 
In industries, the speed of the process depends on the need for standardization. In case of network 
externalities, for example, that pressure is great. The famous example is the race towards the technical 
standard for videorecorders. The emergence of one outcome among possible alternatives is influenced by 
current institutions and flukes of chance and coincidence: what happens to be around in the form of 
adequate materials, skills, instruments, organization, infrastructure, attitudes, habits of thought and other 
institutions. In other words: it needs to be embedded in existing institutional arrangements. That is why a 
given technology may yield different practices in different countries or even in different organizations 
  7within an industry. Barley (1986) gives an example of how the use of electronic scanning devices is 
organized differently, with different results, in different hospitals. The outcome often is not predictable 
and may not be intended. Development may be locked into a path that later turns out to be sub-optimal or 
even counter-productive (Arthur 1989, David 1985). 
In the history of technology science has often followed from the ‘tinkering’ or trial and error of 
technology, and the externalization of tacit knowledge, rather than leading technology. Mokyr (1990: 
170) claimed that in the last 150 years the majority of inventions were used before people understood 
why they worked. This occurred in agricultural technology, mechanical machinery, metallurgy, the 
textile industry and shipping. Increasingly, from the second half of the nineteenth century, scientific 
understanding came to feed technological development. An example is the invention of telegraphy, 
which required the theoretical notion of electro - magnetic waves invented by Maxwell in 1865 (Mokyr 
1990: 144). Chemistry also was also to a large extent guided by science. Nevertheless, the reverse order 
of practical tinkering preceding understanding still occurs, as has been exhibited in the information 
technology revolution (Dosi 1984). 
Why does consolidation take place? It results from a drive towards efficiency and standardization of 
operation, application and production. At first, the drive is toward feasibility, in the form a working 
model. But the innovation also has to be fitted into systems of use, production and distribution, and 
when appropriate systems are not in place, they need to be developed. Alternatively, an inferior 
innovation with better fit in existing systems may win. When a novel product, in a constellation or 
architecture (Henderson or Clark 1990) of components or elements, consolidates, it gets translated into 
an organizational architecture for efficient production, with specialized activities for different 
elements. Subsequently the focus shifts from the architecture of product and organization to the 
optimization of elements or activities within them. The firm in its function as a focusing device shapes 
cognitive categories around existing architectures.   
The occurrence and speed of consolidation depend on competitive pressure. As novelty becomes 
diffused, and patents wear out and the competencies involved become less tacit and more imitable, 
competition increases and exerts pressure to produce more efficiently, by utilizing economies of scale 
and scope. Economy of scale requires expansion. It typically entails division of labour, with 
specialization of labour across different linkages in a chain of production and distribution. This 
requires systematization and standardization, which requires that tacit knowledge be ‘externalized’ 
into documented knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), so that it can be efficiently incorporated in 
standard operating procedures and specifications of systemic linkages 
The outcome of consolidation serves as a platform for expansion and new applications. It provides the 
‘techno-economic paradigm’ (Freeman and Perez 1989) to be followed along a ‘technical trajectory’. 
Next to the achievement of efficiency in exploitation, this provides the second rationale for 
consolidation. It will be argued that this expansion, called ‘generalization’, provides the basis for 
exploration, for accumulating experience as input for the next novelty. The transformation of tacit to 
codified, documented knowledge, in consolidation, is part of this. Such codification serves to abstract 
know-how from the specific context in which it developed. This is needed for the transfer of 
knowledge for efficient exploitation in new contexts. In consolidation tacit knowledge is partly 
transformed to codified knowledge and partly lost. In application in novel contexts new tacit 
knowledge is absorbed again. 
In the stage of consolidation we can identify several types or aspects of entrepreneurship. First, there is 
a need to escape from the chaos of trial and error, to commit on a design and carry it through 
development, testing and entry to markets. This requires leadership and charisma to mobilize people in 
an uncertain and sometimes quite arbitrary looking venture, as recognized by Schumpeter. For those 
reasons it may be difficult to obtain outside capital, so that the entrepreneur may also have to be a 
capitalist, as recognized by Marshall. It requires the willingness to accept risk and tenacity to survive 
the inevitable setbacks, as recognized by Knight. There is also an element of arbitrage, in matching 
supply and demand, as recognized by Cantillon and the Austrians. However, it is not adequate, in this 
stage of the cycle, to conceive of this in terms of given products and demand on the basis of given 
preferences. There is still experimentation and selection among different product forms. Users are 
trying to grasp the use and usefulness of the new product, adapt their preferences to the new 
possibilities, and may postpone purchase until uncertainty about the product and its price drop, due to 
economies of experience and scale in production.   Subsequently, as a dominant design arises, a 
  8different kind of entrepreneurship is needed, to establish a fitting organizational architecture. As sales 
expand, authority and control have to be delegated, since control can no longer be exerted by direct 
observation, more formalized procedures have to be designed. The firm needs to be set up as a 
focusing device. This is related to the notion of management, as recognized by Marshall and Say. 
However, here management is certainly not routine. I propose that this organizational development 
requires a genuine kind of entrepreneurship. It entails risk and requires imagination and leadership for 
the development of novel forms of organization. But it is different from the earlier kind of 
entrepreneurship. Often, the initial entrepreneur fails to make the turnaround to this managerial type of 
entrepreneurship. This may result in the firm being taken over to consolidate its success.     
 
Inertia 
While consolidation is needed for efficient exploitation and for generalization, it can develop into 
inertia. Why this inertia? Why stick to established practice in the face of failures? Clearly, inertia can 
be disastrous. But directly after a novelty has settled down, and ‘come into its own’, one could not 
possibly step directly to the next novelty. Such a leap is difficult to imagine. Entrepreneurship may 
consist of radical jumps into the dark, with a large risk of failure and a small chance of successful radical 
innovation. On the aggregate level of the economy such jumps are beneficial when the weight of 
incidental success exceeds the weight of frequent failure. But on the level of the firm it is generally ill 
advised. It is counterproductive to drop and replace practices too soon, before one knows their limits and 
possibilities for replacement. That would lead to random drift rather than improvement (Lounamaa & 
March 1987). 
Kuhn (1970) not only noted, descriptively, that scientists tend to stick to the ‘puzzle solving’ of 
‘normal science’, but also indicated, normatively, that a certain amount of theoretical tenacity is 
rational. First, there is a principle of economy: we do not and should not surrender theory at the first 
occurrence of a falsifier, indicating that our theory is not perfect. It is rational to wait until the 
cumulative weight of anomalies becomes excessive in some sense. But there is more: it is only by 
ongoing tests of theory that we find where its real strengths and weaknesses lie. Even Popper (1970: 
55) recognized this, in spite of his drive to keep science open to criticism:    
 
‘I have always stressed the need for some dogmatism: the dogmatic scientist has an important role to 
play. If we give in to criticism too easily, we shall never find out where the real power of our theories 
lies’. But in the spirit of his critical rationalism, Popper elsewhere says (1970: 52): ‘in my view the 
“normal” scientist, as Kuhn describes him, is a person one ought to feel sorry for’.  
 
We need to exhaust our theories to a sufficient extent, before we give them up, not only to recoup our 
investment in them, so to speak, but also to develop the motivation for a novel alternative, by an 
accumulation of anomalies. This has been recognized also in the literature on organizational learning. 
There is a trade-off between the need to adapt and the costs involved in terms of uncertainty whether 
novelty will be successful, and uncertainty about the organizational repercussions (March 1991). To 
make the step to novel practice one must be prepared to ‘unlearn’ (Hedberg 1981), in the sense of no 
longer taking established procedures for granted. Thus a condition for innovation generally is that there is 
perceived need, mostly from external pressure, a threat to continued existence or a shortfall of 
performance below aspiration levels, as has been the dominant view in the literature on organizational 
learning (see the survey by Cohen & Sproull 1996). 
However, this is not a necessary condition: one may stumble, so to speak, on novelty without seeking 
it to repair bad performance. Nor is it a sufficient condition. While necessity may be the mother of 
invention, that may also need a father. Above all, we need to accumulate experience to find out what 
elements are eligible for preservation in the exploration of ‘novel combinations’, and what other 
elements and from where, to combine them with. This point does not yet seem to have been 
appreciated in the literatures on innovation and organizational learning. Thus a certain amount of 
conservatism is rational, but of course it can easily become excessive and block innovation. 
The basic idea deriving from this is that before we can replace any practice, of theory, technology or 
organization, we first need to pursue its potential, in a range of applications in a variety of contexts. 
We need this in order to build up the motive for change, to discover limits of validity and to gather 
indications how to change it and what elements to preserve from it, and how, in a novel practice. We 
  9do not know beforehand which elements are robust under changing contexts, and hence worth 
preserving, before we have subjected them to a variety of trials. This is how we might conduct 
abduction and reconcile exploitation and exploration: while employing the practice we are at the same 
time exploring its limits and opportunities for its change and replacement. Or, to put it more 
succinctly: as in crime, the transgression of existing principles requires motive, opportunity and 
means. Before the need for replacement of an existing practice arises such a move would be wasteful, 
and before opportunity and means arise it would be impossible. 
This puts the notion of ‘inertia’ of organizations into a new perspective. Inertia is not only needed for 
co-ordination and control, for the sake of efficiency in exploitation. It also represents the principle of 
tenacity: the need to preserve existing principles in order to find out where and why they fail and how 
they might be replaced, as a contribution to exploration. 
 
Generalization 
Let us see how exploration is likely to proceed, if due to competitive pressures it is to proceed effectively 
and efficiently. The most straightforward way to explore the limits of effectiveness or validity of an 
existing practice, and at the same time survive by ongoing exploitation of available resources, is to 
generalize application of the practice to novel contexts. This what we see in individual development as 
well as development of firms and markets: attempts are made to carry a successful practice into 
neighbouring areas of application. This second stage I call the stage of ‘generalization’. 
Consolidation provides the basis for generalization: for carrying the practice to novel contexts. This 
enables us to profit from the variety of context. This can only be done if sufficient flexibility for 
adaptation is allowed there. For this, dominant designs may operate as ‘prototypes’ (Rosch 1977). 
Deviations are allowed in details, while sufficient similarity to the prototype is maintained to preserve 
the identity of the dominant design. This can yield a variety of manifestations that in principle may 
have no feature in common, while each preserves sufficient resemblance to the prototype, in chains of 
‘family resemblance’ (Wittgenstein). 
If the objective is to conduct exploitation in such a way that it contributes to exploration, we should 
seek to do it in a way that optimizes both profit from exploitation and the gathering of the elements of 
discovery: motive, opportunity and means. More specifically, these elements of discovery are the 
following. First: insight into limitations of current practice. Second: identification of elements of 
current practice that can be preserved in novel combinations because they do not form the cause of 
such limitations and are persistently effective. Third: elements from other, neighbouring practices with 
which they can be combined with a reasonable perspective for useful and workable novelty. Fourth: 
insight in architectural principles by which these elements can be combined with a reasonable chance 
of success in utilizing their potential. For all this we need variety of context. We need the movement 
from one context of application to another in such a way that the next novel context is sufficiently 
close to afford viable exploitation and sufficiently different to yield novelty of tests and novelty of 
insight where limitations and opportunities for improvement lie. This is related to the notion of 
cognitive distance discussed earlier. We need sufficient distance to yield novelty, but distance should 
not be so large as to preclude comprehension. Note that generalization is not automatic. It may be 
blocked by exit or entry barriers, which deprive progress of its source of variety. 
The contexts across which a practice is generalized may be new markets for existing products. For 
example: new segments in domestic markets, foreign markets, new technological conditions of 
production (labour, materials, components, machinery, tools), or new conditions of markets (use, 
competition) and distribution systems. 
New contexts may also entail new applications of existing technology, or of forms of organization or 
governance, in new products or new organizations. In all cases one will encounter differences of 
context that may necessitate or may suggest modifications, which lead to differentiation. In the case of 
firms, ‘neighbouring practices’ from which one may derive inspiration for change may be competing 
products, alternative technologies with similar uses, alternative distribution systems, new practices or 
needs of customers. 
I propose that there is an underlying, pervasive ‘imperialistic’ drive to utilize resources in novel contexts, 
in all living systems.
 This drive may be innate in people because of its evolutionary advantage in 
providing the basis for learning that I claim here. Such Imperialism also has an economic rationale. 
  10Extension of an existing practice to wider fields of application carries the potential reward of economy of 
scale and scope. 
Exploration of novel applications across contexts can to a greater or lesser extent be done virtually rather 
than actually, by thought experiments, scenario’s, simulation of prototypes, inspection or ‘reverse 
engineering’ of practices or products used elsewhere. There is great leverage in communication with 
others, at an appropriate cognitive distance, fitting to one’s communicative ability. But as in all 
speculation it will at some point need to be put to the test of reality. That is where the surprises occur 
from which we can learn. 
In this stage of generalization we find entrepreneurship in opening up or entering new markets, as 
recognized by Mangoldt and Schumpeter. There is also an element of arbitrage: carrying products to 
unsatisfied demand.  
 
Differentiation and reciprocation 
As one moves through a variety of novel contexts, the practice needs to be differentiated to fit to them, or 
novel opportunities for improvement may present themselves. This is the next stage of ‘differentiation’. 
One may need to adjust to a different availability of material inputs and tools, competencies of people, 
acceptance of products produced. Note that this adaptation is not guaranteed. In a seller’s market without 
much competitive pressure the incentive to adapt and improve may not be sufficient. 
Here, the process of narrowing by eliminating redundancies, and the reduction of variety of practice, in 
the first stage of consolidation, is reversed into a process of widening into different versions and 
extensions of the novelty, with increasing variety. 
It does not seem a coincidence that the geographical discoveries, in the 15th to the 17th century, preceded 
the surge of scientific and technological discoveries in Europe. Perhaps they reflect the challenges and 
opportunities of generalization that I propose here as crucial for innovation. Conversely, part of the 
explanation why the tremendous early technical progress in China came to stagnate after 1400 may lie in 
the halting of geographical exploration, due to a decision by the imperial court in 1430 (Mokyr 1990: 
231).  
A proximate form of differentiation is to modify elements while preserving the architecture in which they 
are connected (Henderson and Clark 1990). Next, one may re-arrange elements of an existing practice 
into novel versions for novel contexts. For this one may tap into memory of previous applications or 
experience with trials in the stage of consolidation. This is a process of problem solving, defined as 
seeking recourse to known ways of doing things (Holland et. al. 1989: 11). The potential and the success 
of this depend on what is available from previous experience in (organizational and personal) memory, 
on inventiveness in problem solving of the people involved, and on communication and co-operation 
between them. 
A further, more ‘distant’ form of adaptation is to adopt elements from foreign practices encountered in 
the novel context. Their success and similarity indicate that they may be potential sources for this. 
Similarity entails having elements in common (inputs, outputs, ways of doing things), serving similar 
markets. Failures of the existing practice are compared with successes of the practices it has come in 
contact with, which yields insight into patterns of failure and potential alternatives. Speculations and 
experiments arise concerning promising adoption of elements from such neighbouring practices. Transfer 
can also go the other way: elements from existing practice are transferred to a foreign practice 
encountered in the new context. This transfer is called ‘reciprocation’. Reciprocation is akin to metaphor 
in language: transferring an element from one concept to another; seeing something in the light of 
something else. 
Differentiation and perhaps also reciprocation can be seen as ‘incremental’ innovations: variations upon a 
theme. But they may lead to more radically novel combinations. 
In this stage of differentiation and reciprocation we see the entrepreneurship of people crossing 
boundaries of accepted practice. They need to convince others to join, or to accept, or the courage, 
strength and stubbornness to row against the stream. Here, the inertia of the integrated firm takes its toll. 
In multinationals there are battles between central office that wants to maintain coherence and company-
wide standards and practices for the sake of exploitation and country subsidiaries that demand room for 
differentiation and reciprocation. The battle gets especially fierce when for the sake of novel 
combinations competencies are developed that are at odds with what is perceived as core competence, or 
alliances are sought with outside business units that are part of competing firms or consort with them. 
  11While the entrepreneur in the stage of consolidation is primarily a socializer, here he is often the rebel 
and maladapted loner. Lack of acceptance may impel him to leave the firm and start up for himself.        
  
Radical innovation 
Recombination of elements from different practices in novel architectures can lead to ‘accommodation’ 
in the form of ‘novel combinations’ (Schumpeter), yielding ‘radical’ or ‘large’ or ‘macro’ innovations. 
Often this is ‘competence destroying’ for incumbent organizations, and outsiders are needed  to make the 
break (Tushman and Romanelli 1985, Tushman and Anderson 1986, Romanelli and Tushman 1994). For 
Schumpeter such innovations were unexplained and random. The literature on punctuated equilibria 
(Gersick  1991) identifies ‘punctuations’ but does not explain where they come from. The great challenge 
is to specify a process by which they arise. 
Innovation does not necessarily have to follow problem solving, and may precede it, or may even precede 
generalization. But it is generally inspired by a change of context (generalization), in an accumulation of 
perceived failure and hints for improvement by comparison with and transfer from other practices. 
Reciprocation between distant practices requires a leap of imagination. The role of chance increases: we 
are in the field of serendipity, but it is the serendipity of the prepared mind. The role of the principle of 
imperialism appears again: in exploring new directions one may hit upon opportunities for transfer that 
one was not looking for. 
This is the ‘King Saul effect’ (Mokyr 1990: 286). Looking for a better dynamo for bicycle lights, Philips 
Company hit upon the development of an electric shaver. Gasoline at first was a useless by - product in 
the derivation of lubricants from crude oil, before it was developed into a fuel for the internal combustion 
motor. Bessemer invented his steel making process while trying to solve problems of a spinning cannon 
shell (Mokyr 1990: 116). 
A radically novel combination is not easy to identify as an opportunity, since it literally does not make 
sense; it cannot be interpreted in terms of existing practices, and therefore extends beyond established 
meanings and corresponding categories. It has no recognizable identity. That is why it is more of a 
lonely, personal affair: it is difficult to have the hunch make sense even to oneself, let alone others. A 
handful of people stumbled upon X-rays, but only Madame Curie saw what it might mean, and what its 
implications and uses might be. 
How, then, do novel combinations arise? As the area of application of an existing practice is expanded, 
problems accumulate in the ongoing process of differentiation and reciprocation. Ad hoc additions and 
modifications mess up the clarity and efficiency of the practice, and increase complexity, resulting in loss 
of efficiency and diminishing returns: it becomes increasingly difficult to make further additions or 
modifications while maintaining coherence. Duplication arises, with foregone opportunities for economy 
of scale. Unsolved failures to perform are accumulated. This provides an incentive to consider a clean-up 
by dropping rather than by only re-arranging elements, in novel structures, in Schumpeterian ‘creative 
destruction’. Above all: existing architecture of the practice imposes limits on the novel elements brought 
in. That is needed to preserve systemic coherence, but it prevents realization of the true potential of new 
elements. Thus pressures build up to break down the architecture to realize the potential of novelty. 
Experience has accumulated as to which novel combinations of elements, gathered in reciprocation from 
a variety of old practices, might be successfully combined, and by which architectural principles. There is 
a basis for reasonable hunches. Such, I propose, is the process of abduction.  
And when success in novel architectures emerges we are back at the beginning: the need for 
consolidation. But this also is not guaranteed: no new practicable synthesis may arise, and development 
may end in chaos. 
Here, in the imagination and trial of novel combinations we find the Schumpeterian entrepreneur par 
excellence.  
  
A cycle of discovery 
The different stages together make up a cycle of discovery, as illustrated in figure 1. Nooteboom 
(1999) develops the cycle further by means of the notion of scripts to model the architecture of mental, 
organizational and industrial routines.  
 
Figure 1: cycle of exploitation and exploration 
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The process can be characterized succinctly as an alternation of variety of content and variety of context. 
In consolidation variety of content is closed down to enable efficient production and to provide a clear 
paradigm, or protototype, as a platform for generalization. This opens up variety of context, which yields 
insight in misfits, in needs and opportunities for adaptation. Note that after consolidation development 
may end in inertia, due to lack of incentives or opportunities for generalization or differentiation. In the 
stage of novel combinations, in novel architectures, these may not settle down, and may get stuck in 
ongoing chaos of trials, errors and ongoing misfits that may lead to the development petering out or being 
dropped.  
In a procedural sense the proposed ‘logic’ or heuristic of discovery is optimal: it provides exploration 
while maintaining exploitation; it minimizes destruction in the process of creation. It is not optimal in the 
substantive sense of resulting from the equation of marginal cost and revenue. That could not be because 
neither would be known. However, being optimal in some looser, procedural, sense, it need not yield a 
unique or optimal outcome. It allows for path  dependence and suboptimal outcomes, and the path taken 
depends on context and coincidence. Different firms can develop different structures even in the same 
industry. As indicated before, ‘logic’ is put between quotation marks, because it is a heuristic rather than 
a logic in the sense of indicating a sequence of stages that is logically or epistemologically inexorable. It 
is a heuristic in the sense that it is generally the best answer to the problem of abduction, the best way of 
exploring while maintaining exploitation.  
However, stages may overlap: there is generalization during consolidation, differentiation during 
generalization, exploration of novel combinations during reciprocation. Stages may even be skipped or 
reversed. The argument only indicates that then progress, in the form of successful renewal, is more 
risky. That is the issue of abduction. But it is certainly conceivable that one might hit upon successful 
novelty more directly, without one or more of the intervening stages. Innovation can occur less syste-
matically, more randomly and spontaneously (Cook & Yanow 1993), when an obvious opportunity 
presents itself without much exploration. But as a general rule one needs to accumulate failures to build 
up the need for change, as well as hints in what directions to look: indications what changes could be 
made with some chance of success, and how. More random jumps would have the advantage of reaching 
the market faster, if they succeed, and to the extent that competition takes the form of races to the market, 
greater risks might be taken in more drastic leaps. Indeed, especially small firms do exhibit such reckless 
behaviour, and thereby they do contribute to the dynamic of economies. But in case of pure trial and error 
the risk of failure would be very high. Also, note that technological opportunities may affect the order 
and length of stages. For example, as indicated before, by simulating the performance of devices on 
computers rather than actually building prototypes and testing them, one may engage in virtual rather 
than actual generalization and differentiation, and in that sense skip those stages in the process of 
searching for viable novel combinations.     
  13The process is not automatic: outside contingencies as well as organizational structure or culture, or lack 
of talent in people or teams, may block transition to a next stage. Consolidation may be limited due to 
alternatives persisting side by side. Generalization may be blocked due to a monopoly maintaining an 
exclusive hold, or due to lack of access to novel contexts (recall the case of stagnation of the Chinese 
empire). Differentiation and reciprocation may be blocked because there is insufficient motivation or 
capability to modify an existing practice. One may get stuck in inertia. There must be a basic interest in 
solving problems and making things work. While need is not a sufficient condition, it is often necessary. 
This corresponds with the notion in the literature on organizational learning that failures are needed to 
force a willingness to relax existing practice and explore variations or alternatives. In this way, as 
Schumpeter argued, crises help creative destruction. This brings in one of the contingencies: in markets 
with little competitive challenge the process may halt due to insufficient pressure. 
  The process of learning or discovery may not even be intended. Note that the process of 
exploration is triggered by the will to expand success, rather than the will to learn. But the experience 
accumulated in expansion in fact yields a basis for learning. 
 
A cycle of (dis)integration 
Some stages in the cycle of discovery require integration of activities, with strong ties, and others require 
disintegration, with loose ties among a variety of autonomous units. The connection between the cycle of 
discovery and the cycle of integration and disintegration depends on a number of conditions concerning 
market, technology and institutions. 
Radical innovation, with novel combinations, entails a redefinition and a reconfiguration of nodes into 
novel scripts, and hence requires a break-up of existing scripts (‘creative destruction’). This entails 
organizational disintegration. That may entail break-up of a firm, or decentralization into highly 
autonomous units. The connection between change and disintegration is in line with a long-standing 
tradition in the management and organization literature. It has been said long ago that stable, predictable 
environments require a ‘mechanistic’, bureaucratic structure, while volatile, unpredictable environments 
require a more loose, ‘organic’ structure (Burns & Stalker 1961, Emery & Trist 1965, Thompson 1967). 
More recently, Stinchcombe(1990) proposed that variety of information sources requires organizational 
disintegration. In the present discussion, ‘integrated structure’ is synonymous with ‘mechanistic’ and 
‘bureaucratic’ structure, and ‘disintegrated’ structure is synonymous with ‘organic’ structure. 
Note that I evade talk only of small versus large firms, because one can have connected firms in 
industrial districts and disconnected units within ‘virtual firms’. It is the degree of integration of 
activities that counts, in different forms of organization ‘between market and hierarchy’. The most 
extreme form of organizational disintegration is autonomous units, under separate ownership, who 
engage in pure, arms-length market transactions. Separately owned units can become more or less 
integrated, in the sense of losing autonomy of decision making and freedom of choice, by more or less 
constraining governance of inter - firm relations. These can entail more or less long-term, more or less 
detailed contracts; mutual dependence by dedicated investments or exchange of hostages, or other 
switching costs; routinization; building of trust. Next, units can become integrated under unified 
ownership, within a single firm. Within the firm, units can be more or less integrated in terms of 
centralization and hierarchical control. This depends on the tightness, rigidity and type of co-ordination. 
These more detailed aspects of (dis)integration go beyond the scope of this paper. 
There still is a significant difference between large and small firms, but it concerns not so much 
technical efficiency as governance and management of meaning. As indicated in transaction cost 
economics, hierarchy yields opportunities to claim information for monitoring and possibilities for 
conflict resolution which exceed those among independent firms. As proposed earlier, the core 
function of a firm is to act as a ‘focusing device’ and to provide ‘shared meanings’; to align 
perceptions, interpretations and evaluations in order to achieve a common goal. However, both 
governance and common perception and understanding can also be achieved to a varying extent in 
various forms of organization ‘between market and hierarchy’.  
The proposition now is that in industries the cycle of discovery is associated with a cycle of 
organizational integration and disintegration, as illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: cycle of integration and disintegration 
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Broadly speaking, the generation of novelty, in the stages of reciprocation and architectural innovation 
(‘novel combinations’), requires more or less disintegrated structures, in highly decentralized firms, with 
a high degree of autonomy, or industrial districts of independent firms. Consolidation and generalization 
require more or less integrated structures, within firms or in tightly connected networks of firms. 
Differentiation requires an intermediate mode, with loosely co-ordinated networks or large firms with 
relatively independent subsidiaries. However, this is a broad generalization that is subject to many 
technological, organizational and institutional contingencies.   
Both integrated and disintegrated structures may survive multiple turns of the cycle. That depends on 
the speed of product change relative to change of production, the degree to which production 
technology is inflexible and dedicated to specific products, the opportunity and need, e.g. from 
competitive pressure, to utilise economy of scale and the adaptation and differentiation of products. A 
large, integrated company can survive if economy of scale is large, products and production are 
systemic, and the opportunity and need to differentiate and change products frequently are small. 
Conversely, disintegrated structures, such as industrial districts, may survive if economy of scale is 
small, products and technology is stand-alone or modular and there is an ongoing need for 
differentiated and fast changing products. 
 
A cycle of entrepreneurship 
According to the cycle of discovery, without innovations of application (in differentiation, reciprocation) 
creative destruction (novel combinations) would not take place. Diffusion does not consist in a simple 
mechanical ‘working out’ of a single innovation. Generally, new contexts or new applications require 
adjustment or ‘re - invention’. Is this secondary innovation Schumpeterian or Kirznerian? The whole 
notion of equilibrium, and the distinction between equilibrating (Kirznerian) and dis - equilibrating 
(Schumpeterian) entrepreneurship becomes problematic. The point of the cycle is that in the combination 
of exploitation and exploration, in consolidation, generalization, differentiation, reciprocation, and novel 
combinations in novel architectures, diffusion lays the basis for the next innovation. What is supposed to 
be equilibrating at the same time is dis-equilibrating in the sense that it prepares for the next innovation. 
Entrepreneurship can be seen in both the creation and the realization of potential. The cycle of discovery 
entails that the realization of potential lays the basis for new creation of potential. Thus, along the cycle 
we find a combination of the two types, with the emphasis shifting from Schumpeterian to Kirznerian. 
There is not any single ‘true’ type of entrepreneurship, but a whole range of types, corresponding with 
the different stages of the discovery process (figure 1). Rather than being alternatives between which one 
must choose, these types are complementary: they build upon each other. In combination with the 
corresponding cycle of integration and disintegration illustrated in figure 2, this idea reflects the notion of 
‘dynamic complementarity’, first proposed by Rothwell (1985, see also Rothwell 1989). According to 
this notion, small and large firms have different roles to fulfil in innovation, and are complementary to 
each other. 
  15The stages of consolidation and generalization, with their shift to more systemic integration, increase of 
scale, division of labour and co - ordination would connect with Say's and Marshall's notions of entrepre-
neurship. Generalization entails the transfer to novel areas of application. For products this entails the 
entry into new markets. This reflects Mangoldt’s notion of entrepreneurship, and was recognized also by 
Schumpeter. In differentiation practices are further adapted to differences in demand. It entails the 
realization of existing potential, but also entails learning and conceptual change, leading up to a next 
innovation, and this is part of Austrian entrepreneurship according to Menger and Hayek. Reciprocation, 
which has the logical structure of metaphor, is more Schumpeterian in that it explores elements for novel 
combinations. Schumpeterian entrepreneurship fully comes into its own (but goes beyond Schumpeter) in 
accommodation towards novel combinations in novel architectures, where existing structures of action 
(scripts) are broken down and from the debris novel practices are experimentally built up, to survive, die 
or be improved in the subsequent stage of consolidation. 
But the point of the discussion is perhaps not to fit in existing notions of entrepreneurship without 
overlap and gaps, and thereby reduce the cycle of discovery to existing notions of entrepreneurship. The 
point is to provide a new perspective beyond existing notions of entrepreneurship, and to deduce types of 
entrepreneurship that were not recognized before. The following types of entrepreneurship then emerge: 
 
In differentiation: 
 -   Incremental innovation or adaptation of practices to a diversity of demand or available inputs, 
technologies and competencies, while maintaining the basic elements and architecture of existing 
practice. The need and opportunity for this derives from attempts at generalization to novel con-
texts. This requires some amount of perceptiveness, imagination, and resources, scope for 
initiative and the courage to use it and accept the risks involved. Organizationally, it requires a 
certain amount of decentralization. Here we need the inventiveness of the ‘intrapreneur’, and the 
ability of management to handle decentralization.  
In reciprocation: 
 -   Importation of elements from ‘adjacent’ practices that in novel contexts appear to be better in 
some respect of product or production, while maintaining the architecture of the practice at hand. 
The requirements from the previous stage apply to a higher degree: imagination to produce 
metaphorical ideas for novel combinations. In an existing firm, it requires an organizational 
structure and culture that allows for that. This can be very problematic and requires 
organizational ingenuity or innovation. How can one organize under disintegration? There is a 
need to balance integration of activities within the firm and collaboration with other firms, in 
alliances. 
In accommodation: 
 -   Recombination of elements from diverse practices in a new architecture. If the origin of ideas lay 
inside a large, integrated organization, this will often require a spin - off. This stage requires 
exceptional imagination, heterodoxy, courage, and organizational autonomy. There is need for a 
capability to act in networks of organizations, in the process of developing and testing novel 
combinations. 
In consolidation: 
 -   Trials of new combinations. This requires risk acceptance, determination, perseverance and 
charisma and leadership to bring other people along, including suppliers of capital. 
 -   Efficient selection of failures. This requires sense of realism, judgement, or an efficient selection 
environment. 
 -   Adapting existing systems of application to allow the innovation to achieve its fullest potential. It 
may require standardization, large - scale production, utilization of scope. This requires 
influence, resources, management, co - ordination. 
In generalization: 
 -   Further standardization, increase of scale, internationalization (export, foreign investment). A 
Chandlerian or Weberian marshalling and rational direction of coherent systems of specialized 
resources. This requires a variety of resources, including international experience and contacts, 
ability to co - ordinate. 
 
  16Let us review how the process works, on the level of an industry. We need to show how firms seeking 
their own self - interest generate discovery in markets. On the industry level, if at any stage incumbents 
failed to utilize any opportunity produced by preceding stages, sooner or later some firm would enter 
from somewhere in the world to do it, if there are no entry barriers to prevent that. Note that when the 
logic of discovery is applied to the market, it is pervaded by competition. But shifts occur between 
different types of competition, and competition is seldom perfect. The drive behind competition is that 
entrepreneurs at all stages try to distinguish themselves from others, and thereby push profits above 
marginal costs. They do this by the following activities: 
 
- differentiating their products (in the stage of differentiation) 
- adding novelties in the form of features from other contexts (in reciprocation) 
- coming up with novel combinations (accommodation) 
- developing the most efficient form of a novelty (consolidation, substage 1) 
- effecting wider systemic changes to utilize the full potential of a novelty (consolidation, substage 2) 
- implementing scale, scope and efficient production 
- carrying the novelty to new contexts by exports and foreign investment (generalization).  
 
Competition does not take the form of everyone doing the same thing and pushing prices to marginal 
costs, but rather by replacing products and practices by ones that are better, in being more efficient, or 
satisfying preferences more closely, or generating novel perspectives for production or consumption.  
A firm is not likely to survive and make a profit if it does not contribute to this process. To do so, it will 
have to offer the type of entrepreneurship which is appropriate to the stage to which it aims to contribute, 
as deduced above. It is not likely to succeed if it tries to organize large scale production before 
knowledge about it has become documented to provide the basis for division and co - ordination of 
labour. The risk of failure is large in carrying a practice to large scale and novel markets before it has 
proven its feasibility and worth. Novel combinations which are a leap in the dark, in random trial, may 
succeed but are less likely to do so than trials informed by experience. Such experience is derived from 
the failures of existing practices, insight in opportunities for variations in different contexts, and 
experiments with novel combinations of elements from practices that have similar elements or 
architectures. 
When we survey the cycle as a whole, the central challenge for leadership is to combine exploitation and 
exploration and solve the corresponding paradox of combining integration and disintegration, or 
alternating between them. How does one arrange for the proper type of entrepreneurship, and the proper 
degree of (dis)integration, or mix of integration and disintegration,  at the proper time? This leads on to a 
more detailed discussion of alternative modes of organizing to do this, which is beyond the scope of the 
present paper (see Nooteboom 2000). 
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